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A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS

COMMON LAW, Including the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of
All Jurisdictions of the United States and Canada. (Third Edition).
By John Henry Wigraore. Little, Brown and Company, Boston,
I94O. (io volumes). Total no. pp. cccxv, 7324. Price: $ioo.
In the thirty-six years since it appeared in first edition, Wigmore on
Evidence has become a familiar masterpiece. The author's unique gifts
as historian, analyst, polemic, stylist-all are so -well known that it would
be trite to remark upon them were they not so perennially amazing. No
less remarkable is his indefatigable industry, the latest token of which is
this third edition.
It was time for a new edition. Witness the many new citations and
sections of text. This edition contains about 85,ooo citations of judicial
decisions, which is 30,000 more than contained in the second edition in 1923
and 45,ooo more than in the first edition. Apparently these new citations
are done with the same painstaking care and scrupulous regard for accuracy
in details which characterized the references in the other two editions. It
is welcome news that a pocket supplement service is promised.
The additional sections of text reflect the expansion of the law into
new fields. Some of the new topics most suggestive of this growth are:
4g. (Rules of Evidence in Labor-Arbitration Agreements), I65a (BloodGroups as evidencing Paternity), 798a (Moving Pictures in Evidence),
997 (Scientific Psychological Diagnosis of Testimony; Modern Methods),
2157 (Authenticating a Radio-Broadcast Message), 2287 (Privilege for
Communication by Radio).
The work is now presented in ten volumes instead of five, but this does
not mean a doubling of total bulk. The new volumes are smaller than the
old and handier to use. Another new feature is the index of quotations
from non-case materials. This will prove a valuable aid in the use of a
text so richly adorned with striking illustration and anecdote.
Of more interest, however, is the extent to which the author has defended some of the basic views expounded in the other editions. Much
searching criticism of these views has accumulated. It has been directed
chiefly against the author's concept of the nature of hearsay evidence and
his view of the effect of presumptions. In his Preface the author takes
cognizance of the existence of this body of literature and asserts that "these
contributions have been cited . . . and, when practicable, some attempt has
been made to give consideration . . . to their views." 1 But he has, for the
most part, found the attempt impracticable, and for reasons which seem
unconvincing. For example, his reasons for not answering criticisms of
his positions on the hearsay rule are that it would consume too much space,
and that, since the future will bring about a wholesale liberalization of the
hearsay rule, the "game would not be worth the candle." 2 "It would be
interesting," he says, "to discuss what theories best represent the law as it
is. But the present writer is now more concerned about the law as it ought
to be and will be." s In no spirit of carping, the last point may be answered
by quoting the concluding sentence of the Preface in which the work is
offered as "an adequate guide to the present state of the law of Evidence."
AT

x. Vol. I, p. xi.
2. Vol. V, p. 210.
3. Id. at 216.

4. Vol. I, p. xii.
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So offered, the book should not neglect discussion of "what theories best
represent the law as it is", even though such a discussion would require
additional space. In the second edition it was found practicable to revise
the treatment of admissions to meet Professor Morgan's provocative questioning of the original exposition. It is regrettable that the precedent thus
established was abandoned in the third edition.
No disparagement is intended of the author's interest in the evidentiary
law of the future. He, above all others, is entitled to assume a fatherly
concern in the course which the reform of Evidence shall take. For it is
largely he who has awakened the profession to the compelling need for
reform. Unremittingly his penetrating analysis has disclosed absurdities
and his delicious satire has ridiculed them. Moreover, he has not shirked
the exacting obligation (often neglected by the advocate of reform) to present the precise tenor of his suggested changes. It has been his practice to
offer model drafts. This edition contains some interesting new ones, chief
of which are those for liberalizing the hearsay rule and for regulating the
practice in regard to presumptions and burden of proof.
He endorses reform by rules of court in lieu of legislation, but he does
not deal with the mooted question of the extent to which the rule-making
power embraces rules of evidence. An expression of his views would, of
course, have been helpful and weighty. It does seem out of place, however,
to ask for more from one who has already contributed so much.
Indeed, when it is remembered that its general excellence as a whole
has made Wignore on Evidence a classic, then it will be cheerfully acknowledged that any criticism of a part is of minor significance only. Professor
Beale hailed the first edition as "the most complete and exhaustive treatise
on a single branch of our law that has ever been written . . .."
Time
has not altered the justice of this judgment. Quite possibly it never will.
James H. Chadbourn.t
LAW, THE STATE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, Vol.

I, A COM-

MENTARY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND INTERNATIONAL IDEALS; Vol. II, EXTRACTS ILLUSTRATING THE GROWTH
OF THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE, GOVERNMENT, AND
THE LAW OF NATIONS. By James Brown Scott. Columbia Univer-

sity Press, New York, 1939. Pp. xxiv, 613; vi, 401. Price: $8.75.
This treatise by the eminent Professor of International Law, Roman
Law, and Jurisprudence, of Georgetown University, and editor of Classics
of International Law, is devoted to a discussion "in more or less chronological order [of] what are believed to be the principal contributions to
legal, political, and international ideals",' as revealed in the philosophical,
religious, and legal thought from Plato to Grotius. The survey ends "prior
to the Thirty Years War", because "legal and political ideals do not flourish
amid the clash of arms." 2
In the Middle Ages, says Dr. Scott,
".. . the idea of a higher and a binding law, of divine origin and
unchangeable content, was everywhere accepted. It made possible the
simultaneous existence of forms of government which, in the absence
of belief in such an all-embracing and all-pervasive law could not but
have been in perpetual conflict. In the modern world, this conception of
5. Beale, Book Review (1905) 18 H.uv. L. Rzv. 478.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
I. Vol. I, p. 593.
2.

Id. at 596.
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a higher law . . . has become dimmed by modem notions of law as
being exclusively positive, and no longer pervades every phase of the
life of individuals and of States. Is it too much to hope that the future
may witness a recrudescence of this conception of an ideal law which
shall serve as a standard for the individual, the nation, and the international community ?" 3'
"It is only because of the so-called 'enlightenment' of the modem
world that an effort has been made to separate law from religion and
morality and place it, so to speak, in a water-tight compartment, where
it may not be 'tainted' by the spiritual standards and aspirations of
man. The result is that law and politics have been for long without a
standard; and that law, government, and international relations are
founded upon expediency instead of upon the bedrock of principle." 4
"What leads to unspeakable tragedies is the separation, in the relations
of States, of the moral and spiritual element from the rules of their
intercourse." 1

The first volume is divided into several parts devoted respectively to
The Greek Background, The Roman Heritage, The Christian Heritage,
The Transition from Medieval to Modem Thought, The Era of Reform,
and The Beginning of the Modem Age. In each of these parts separate
chapters are given to biographies and selected writings of the leading
philosophers or moralists of the period: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; Cicero,
Seneca; St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante Alighieri; Machiavelli,
Vitoria, Bodin, Gentili; St. Thomas More, Martin Luther; Grotius, Suarez;
and others. The second volume contains, what Dr. Scott calls, a "codification" of selected excerpts from approved writings and other documents of
the times under review on Jurisprudence, The State, and the Law of
Nations.
The treatise of Dr. Scott presents a solemn profession of faith in the
supremacy of justice as the only sure foundation of Law, the State, and the
International Community, and constitutes a crowning achievement of a long
and distinguished work in the field of international justice.
Alexander N. Sack.t
By
Edgar N. Durfee and John P. Dawson. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1939. Pp. xxxvii, 964. Price: $6.5o.
The casebook reviewed bears the title of Cases on Remedies-HI. It
has been published prior to Volume I, which, according to the reviewer's
information, is to be Professor Durfee's Cases on Equity brought up to date
and revised and which thus far has appeared only in mimeographed form
for use at the University of Michigan Law School. Volume II is not, however, so interconnected or interrelated with Volume I that it cannot be
used alone with perfect satisfaction as a casebook in equity and quasicontracts, even though the student has not used Durfee's Cases on Equity
in its older or revised form in his earlier equity courses. This is true in
the same way that Volume III of Cook's Cases on Equity was usable without previous study of Volumes I and II of Cook.
The reviewer had the good fortune to use the casebook under review
in his class in Equity III during the fall semester beginning in 1939 for a
CASES ON REMEDIES, Vol. II: RESTITUTION AT LAW AND IN EQUITY.

3. Id. at 211.
4. Id. at ii.
5.Id. at 35.
t Professor of Law, New York University.
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three hour a week course. During that time he covered all the cases save
from 669 through 820, thus having covered all but 151 pages out of a total
of 964. The materials are of such a nature as to afford an effective three
hour course and admit of satisfactory condensation for a two hour course
as well. It is interesting that both this casebook and Professor Thurston's
Cases on Restitution (194o) contain exactly 964 pages of body and index.
In the opinion of the reviewer the present casebook offers a happy
climax to fifty years of development of American casebooks on QuasiContracts. Professor Keener, who also wrote the first textbook on the
subject, published his two volume casebook in 1888 and 1889. He was
shortly followed by Professors Scott and Woodruff, each of whom published casebooks in 1905. The middle of this period was marked by the
appearance of the first edition of Thurston in 1916. In 1924 at the beginning of the last third of the period Professor Cook conceived the idea of
combining Quasi-Contracts with Equity. The importance of Cook's contribution was indicated by the fact that Professors Durfee and Dawson in
their preface indicate that their greatest debt was to Cook. Cook published
a second edition on 1932, Laube a third edition of Woodruff in 1933, and
Patterson his Cases on ContractsII in 1935. During the next three years
two very important events occurred. The Restatement of Restitution was
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1937, and the revised edition
of Williston on Contracts with its copious materials on Quasi-Contracts was
published during 1936, 1937, and 1938. While no separate textbooks or
treatises on Quasi-Contracts or Restitution were published, obviously the
Restatement and the revised Williston made a new mass of materials available. Much could therefore be expected of the new casebook by Durfee
and Dawson that was not expected of earlier casebooks. And these expectations were richly rewarded in the current volume. The reviewer had the
unique experience of having several students on their own initiative express
great enthusiasm for their casebook.
Professors Durfee and Dawson have done more than select cases.
They have done a magnificent job of editing in the way of textual notes and
footnotes. This editorial matter covers perhaps as much as one third of the
space in the book. Thus this casebook, like that of Chafee and Simpson's
Cases on Equity, will be invaluable in the office of a practitioner, though it
should be noted that it is not so well indexed as the latter. Most of the
editorial notes involve brilliantly analyzed and up-to-date materials nowhere
else available, at least in a single volume. The cases selected are well edited
and involve many recent decisions. The authors might, in the opinion of
the reviewer, more often have cited the law review annotations to the cases
employed as casebook cases.1
Lester B. Orfield.t
i. For instance, Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd.,

Inc., p. 34, was noted in (1921) 5 MINx. L. REV. 401; Allen v. M. Mendelsohn & Son,
p. 44, in (1923) 21 MicH. L. REv. 8ig; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Fancher, p. 112,
in (1895) 9 HARv. L. REV. 225; West v. Walker, p. 184, in (1930) 30 COL. L. REv.

1205, 5 TuIrANE L. REv. 145, 6 Wis. L. REv. 37; Malmberg v. Baugh, p. 336, in (1924)
33 YALE L. J. 435; Kelly v. Hance, p. 361, in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 389; Reedy v.
Ebsen, p. 379, in (1933) 31 MicH. L. REV. 286, (1932) io N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 94;
Oxborough v. St. Martin, p. 405, in (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 337, 40 HAv. L. REv. 648;
Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., p. 446, in (1930) 30 COt. L. REv. 899; Miller v. Stanich,
P. 463, in (193i) 16 IowA L. REV. 275, 29 Micr. L. REV. 786, 6 Wis. L. REv. 246;
L. Lewjitt & Co. v. Jewelers' Safety Fund Soc., p. 272, in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 682;
Teteman v. Epstein, P. 488, in (1925) 13 CALIF. L. REV. 246, (1926) 26 Cot. L. REV.
994; Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, p. 525, in (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 907; Hugo
v. Erickson, p. 533, in (1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 785; Rosenblum v. Manufacturers Trust
Co., p. 548, in (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 618; etc.
t Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.

260

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS. By Alexander Holtzoff.
American Bar Association, Chicago, 194o. Pp. viii, 2o8. Price:
$2.00.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure produced a very extraordinary
educational activity to acquaint the profession with the new reform. Lectures, institutes, books and articles' came in rapid succession; and the end
is not yet. Here is another addition to the already large library of literature
on the Rules. But I am afraid that despite the imposing title and the standing of the author and the publisher, the book hardly constitutes a contribution.
The text of the volume, apart from the index and the introduction,
runs to one hundred and sixty-three pages. About half of this total is
devoted to a verbatim reprint of the Rules and the citation of cases applying them. About half of the remaining pages is devoted to a repetition of
the Rules, not verbatim but fairly literally. What is left consists substantially of one sentence statements of the holdings in the three hundred and
sixty-five cases cited. Sometimes these are stated as positive rules; for
example,
". ..
an unincorporated labor union may be sued as an entity in
its common name. Similarly, a partnership may be made a plaintiff in
its firm name in a suit for the infringement of a patent." 2 "Matters
of opinion are not appropriate subjects for interrogatories." a
At other times the holdings are stated only as such, with the caution of an
"it has been held". Apparently the difference in the form of statement is
simply a matter of style. The volume contains practically no analysis,
criticism or comment by the author, beyond an occasional adulatory remark
about the new procedure. There is no reference to any literature other than
the three hundred and sixty-five cases,4 well over ninety percent of which
are, necessarily of course, decisions of district courts. And there is no
effort to explore the problems raised by these cases or their reason in different situations of fact.5 What the volume contributes, then, is a classification of the cases ii the first approximately fifteen months of the life of
the Rules. And it was rapidly becoming out of date even as it was rolling
off the press.
The purpose of the author and of the Bar Association in publishing
this book was to provide "the bench and bar" with a "ready source of information" as to the new procedure by combining in one volume citations of
the decisions on the Rules which the author had been compiling in Department of Justice Bulletins that were sent to government attorneys and judges
I. In the West Publishing Company's Manual of Federal Procedure, nine pages
are required to list the articles on the Rules in the legal periodicals.
2. P. 57. The text does not explain the significance of the clause "in a suit for the
infringement of a patent." There is probably no intention to imply that the rule is
otherwise in other suits or that there is anything peculiar about a patent suit in this regard. This seeming hesitation to generalize is not, however, at all typical.
3. P. go. "
4. Except that on p. 29 there is a reference to 2 CHITTY, PLEADING (7th ed. 1844)
529, and on p. 54 there is cited an article by Judge Sweeney, Expert Use of Pretrial
Docket in Federal Court (1939) 23 J. Am. JuD. Soc. iI. See note I supra.
5. For example, the problems indicated by Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., io6 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) are given this single sentence: "A judgment
disposing of one of several claims and leaving another to be subsequently tried is final
and appealable" (p. 157).

Cf. (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1476. Also compare Chapter V,

Depositions and Discovery, with Pike and Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation
(I94o) 7 U. OF CHL L. REV. 297.

BOOK REVIEWS

and were published in the American Bar Association Journa. This purpose may be laudable despite the fact that Callaghan and Company publishes a current Federal Rules Service which keeps up to the minute on
Rules decisions, that the West Publishing Company publishes the Federal
Rules Decisions series and its Manual of Federal Procedure, kept up to date
by pocket supplement, and that there are several treatises on the Rules
(Moore, Simdns, Edmunds, for example) which are likewise kept up to
date by pocket supplement. If the Bar Association wishes to supply a
cheaper source of information, it should publish an occasional paper pamphlet with cumulative citation of cases under each Rule number. Twenty
pages would be quite ample for the purpose even if the citations were
accompanied by a sentence stating their holdings, as in this volume. And
such a pamphlet would not be reviewed in the legal periodicals.
Harry Shulman.t

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE LANSING PAPERS, 1914-1920. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1939, 1940. (2 volumes). Pp. lxii, 8oi;

xl, 576. Price: $1.50, $1.25.*
"L[ansing]. . . . I do not know how your Government can
modify submarine warfare and make it effective and at the same time
obey the law and the dictates of humanity.
"B [emstorff]. Humanity. Of course war is never humane.
"L. 'Humanity' is a relative expression when used with 'war' but
the whole tendency in the growth of international law in regard to
warfare in the past 125 years has been to relieve non-combatants of
needless suffering.
"B. Of course I think it would be an ideal state of affairs, .
This conversation, and the correspondence from which it is quoted,
throws more light on the diplomacy of the last war than many formal notes
and legal documents. It shows that Lansing, like Wilson, was not a lawyer
but a moralist. They regarded the "principles of law and humanity" as
synonymous, and American statecraft was based on their identity. 2 But
the moral character which the President and his Secretary gave the State,
on the analogy of an individual, was the antithesis of the Nietzschean doctrine of the non-moral State upon which Germany acted.' What Wilson
defined as "just rules of international law" were neither just nor law in
German eyes. 4 The Foreign Office never accepted his fundamental premise
that "England's violation of neutral rights is different from Germany's violation of the rights of humanity." ' This discrimination between law and
morality was more apparent than real because Germany alone was accused
6. See Foreword by Hon. Edgar B. Tolman, p. iv.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
* Department of State Publications i42o, I42i.
I. Vol. I, p. 556.

2. Id. at 417.
3. See HARLEY NorrE, THE ORIGms OF THE FOREIGN PoLicy oF WOODROW WInSON (1937).

4. Vol. I, p. 368.
s. Id. at 42I (italics supplied).
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of sinning against both. Too much has been made of the failure of American statesmen to preserve neutrality by treating the belligerents impartially
and with judicial prudence. Peace was never their primary concern nor
law their guide. The course of events taught them, as Lansing confessed
in the soliloquy of a diplomatic Hamlet, that international law was law only
in peace and that in a world at war there was nothing left of it but the
morality of natural law.8
There was also the national interest of a democracy to defend, and
Lansing was its champion. In his War Memoirs,7 which were written from
this correspondence, he explained his policy. It was to enter the war
against Germany as soon as public opinion could be aroused to fighting
temper, because otherwise a German victory over the Allies would threaten
American interests and institutions---"democracy".
Wilson was slow to
reach this conclusion, from which Lansing started, but his Secretary urged
him toward it on every occasion. 9 Although Lansing had no fear that a
victorious Germany would attack the United States directly,10 he believed
that the two nations were opposed in polity and that a pre-war balance of
power was essential to the security of the western hemisphere. This correspondence contains additional evidence of how much he was moved by
apprehensions of German influence and design in Latin America and the
Caribbean."1
If these comments read like a tract for the times, it must be the fault
either of the times or of the Lansing papers. The correspondence adds
nothing important to what is already known of the abortive efforts to work
out a modus vivendi for submarine warfare in 1916, the Ishii negotiations,
and military intervention in Russia. There is nothing at all, unfortunately,
on the peace conference or Lansing's break with Wilson. Since these two
volumes contain a selection from the papers which the Secretary took with
him on leaving office, it is to be hoped that more will be published. The
papers printed in these volumes have been carefully edited by Dr. J. S.
Beddie with numerous cross-references to the documents previously issued
in the supplements on Foreign Relations. Thus the State Department has
made its historical record of the last war nearly complete.
Roger W. Shugg.t

A

SHORT HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY.

By J. John Lawler and Gail Gates Lawler. The Fouhdation Press,
Inc., Chicago, 194o. Pp. xxii, 2o4. Price: $2.50.
Unquestionably there is a need for a more widespread knowledge of
the history of the law of real property. The judge, the lawyer and the
legislator need this knowledge not only for an understanding of the law
itself, but also for an understanding of the very words and expressions in
common use in the opinions, in the practice of real property law, and in the
preparation and enactment of our statutes. Obviously the way to educate
our future lawyers is to arouse an intelligent interest in the student at the
very beginning of his studies.
6. Id. at 227-37.
7. (1935).
8. LANSING, WAR MEMOIRS (935)

17-21.

9. Vol. I, pp. 407-8, 417, 537-38.
io. See Alfred Vagts, Hopes and Fears of an Anglo-German War, 87o-z9i5, II
(March 194o) 55 POL. ScI. Q. 53-76.
ii.Vol. II, pp. 466-67, 498-99, 501-3, 514-16; LANSING, WAR MMoIRs (1935)
310-I1.

t Assistant Professor of History, Princeton University.
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The idea of preparing and publishing an introduction to the study of
the law of real property is not new, a number of such works having
appeared from time to time, but this work is designed to present to the
student in a simple and plain manner the history of the law, without confusing him with quotations and excerpts from our learned historians, which
are often difficult of comprehension by an experienced practitioner, with a
comparison of the former law with the modern usage.
This plan is accomplished by setting forth the old law and its historical
development and following this with a presentation of the existing law,
showing what of the old is now obsolete and what has been retained and
adapted to the changed conditions of the present time. Incidentally the
student comes to realize that the very words and expressions he is learning
to use have a modern meaning and significance which can be understood
and appreciated only by one having an acquaintance with their history and
origin.
Pennsylvanians are fortunate in having available a succession of textbooks on real property law, Mitchell, Fallon, Nicholson and Bushong, all
of which contain historical explanations. However, these books are not
histories, but rather are modern textbooks with such historical explanations
as seem to be necessary. The present work is first a history, with the
modern application following, thus making the history more easily comprehended and guiding the interested student in further investigations.
The writers disclaim credit for original research in the preparation of
this work but the evidences of extensive reading and study are apparent
both from the arrangement adopted and from the text itself, as also from
the footnotes and the extensive bibliography at the end of each chapter.
The expressed intention of the authors is to make accessible to first
year students the material presented by profound scholars of legal history,
but this book will no doubt be used by many busy judges and practitioners
as a ready reference and guide to these aithoritafive sources. The list of
references, arranged as it is in relation to the various subjects discussed, is
invaluable.
With such a vast amount of material to select from the choice of what
should be developed in detail must have been difficult, and if any criticism
were to be made it would be that some subjects are treated too briefly rather
than of what is set forth at length. For example, the description of curtesy
as "the interest given to the husband in the lands of the wife after her
death" would hardly suggest to the student that after the birth of issue
capable of inheriting, even though the wife were still living, the husband
had a vested life estate, for which he did homage alone, and which could be
aliened and held and enjoyed as against the wife. On the other hand
tenures, the various estates in land, seisin and so forth, are fully treated in
a clear and understandable way.
There are some minor inaccuracies, of course, as may be discovered by
a reader acquainted with the law of his own state, but these are such as
will not interfere with the main purpose of the work, which is to make plain
and understandable an otherwise difficult and often discouraging subject.
This book is highly commended to first year students of real property law
and to any who wish to have a ready reference to more advanced treatises
on particular subjects.
Mark R. Craig.'
t Vice-President, Union Title Guaranty Company, Pittsburgh; Author of PENNPRoPmRTY.
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LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. By Lord Wright of Durley. The University Press, Cambridge; The Macmillan Co., New York, 1939. Pp.
xxxv, 442. Price: $3.75.

This book reveals Wright as a judge with sufficient interest and understanding to go beyond the minutia of daily decision to the larger aspects
of the art he practices. Ii a series of essays and addresses written and
delivered within the last few years, Lord Wright concerns himself with the
fundamental problems which so delight the law school student and out of
which the new law will issue. He considers such topics as unjust enrichment and restitution, mistake in contracts, public policy, the rules revolving
about Rylands v. Fletcher,consequential damages, and whether the doctrine
of consideration ought to be abolished. There is also discussion, which I
found less interesting, of smaller points, such as the recent gold clause litigation and developments in commercial law during the past century, as
well as reviews of books by Williston and Wigmore and some harmless
writing on the study of the law, the influence of law in our daily life and in
memory of Sir Frederick Pollock.
In general, the author's opinions will have the commendation of those
in the van of legal thought. On the basis of this book I am willing to say
that Wright must be a good judge, although I have met only one or two of
his decisions. The articles on restitution show a sense of fairness and
justice unconfined by technicality, and the one on consideration advocates
a rule of common decency which certainly ought to be the law. He is
sympathetic to social reform, tolerant, openminded, fair, informed, but
mindful of tradition and precedent. These qualities should satisfy us.
Cardozo's genius or Holmes's fire may be hoped for, but seldom expected.
The important thing about Wright is that his hunches and sympathies
appear, in the main, to lie on the right side of the line and that is what means
most.
The book says nothing that is very new. It will not startle the legal
world, and it probably will not be widely read. Nevertheless, there is some
concrete gain in having reforms and extensions of the law vouched by a
Lord of Appeals. The book is well written, the only faults I found with it
being an occasional lapse into ten and twelve page paragraphs, and some
repetition in the subject matter of the'various essays. A positive merit is
the absence of deadening, useless pages of footnotes. The articles collected
here fulfill the proper function of a law review article: the elaboration of a
principle by a writer expressing his view of the problem and the reasons
for it, illustrated by a few of the leading cases in the field. Law review
articles, of late, and especially those contributed by academic authors, have
too often been mere catalogues of cases unillumined by their writei's, who
mistakenly believe they can supplant the digests. Lord Wright shows how
unnecessary that is.
HaroldE. Kohn.t
t Member of the Bar, Philadelphia.

